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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O,F THE STATE OF UTAH 
H. OJ1~0RGE BHA\DBURY, Adminis-1' 
trator of the EstatP of Georg(• R. 
Bradbury, dPecasf'cl, and ALTHEA 
1~1\.\DBURY, 
Plaiuf'iffs aud Resprmdrnfs, 
-\·s.-
UOH!Hl~ L. RAS?\IUSSEN 
YOTL\ OENE RAS:\IPSRFJK, 
his wife, 
and 




BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action by R. George Bradbury 
as Administrator of his father's estate, George R. Brad-
bury, deceased, and Althea Bradbury, surviving widow 
of George R. Bradbury, to cancel and annul a deed and 
conveyance ()f certain real property and water rights (rep-
resented by shares of stock in the Joseph Irrigation Com-
pan~?) from George R. Bradbury and Althea Bradbury 
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to the Defendants, in which the Grantors reserved a life 
estate to themselves and to the survivor of them, and to 
cancel and annul a farm lease agreement executed be-
tween the parties, whereby Defendants leased the farm 
and agreed to operate the same and pay to Grantors one-
half the proceeds derived therefrom during such life 
estate. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried by the Court without a jury, al-
though demand for jury was made and not waived; and 
after rendering its Findings of Fact the Court deter-
mined as a sole conclusion of law that the Defendants 
''in their confidential relationship, exerted undue in-
fluence upon the transferors'' thereby entitling Plain-
tiffs to a judgment declaring the deed and transfer of 
water stock, together with the farm lease agreement, to 
be null and void and rescinded. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The trial court's decision in favor of Plaintiffs, as 
reported in its written decision, was based upon the er-
roneous determination that ''a close and confiential rela-
tionship" existed between Plaintiffs and Defendants so 
that "the burden of proof is shifted so as to require" 
the Defendants to sustain the validity of the transfer of 
property and execution of the farm lease. (R. 33, 50) 
As a result of placing the burden of proof upon the 
Defendants to prove the fairness of the transaction, the 
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court further erroneously concluded that "Defendants 
in their confidential relationship, exerted undue influence 
upon the Transferors.'' (R. 53) 
This appeal is taken for the purpose of having this 
court determine: ( 1) That no "confidential relationship" 
Pxi~tt•d between the Bradburys and Defendants as that 
term is considered in its legal significance so that Defend-
ants did not have the burden of proving the fairness of 
the transaction; (2) That Plaintiffs failed to show by 
dear and convincing proof that the Defendants exerted 
"undue influence" upon the Bradburys in connection 
with the transaction; (3) That there was adequate con-
sideration for the transfer of property and execution of 
the lease; and ( 4) that the case in any event should have 
been tried to a jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
George R. Bradbury, now deceased, and his wife Al-
thea Bradbury (who has since remarried and is now Al-
thea "'"ashburn, but whom we will for convenience refer 
to as ~[rs. Bradbury) lived in Joseph, Utah, where they 
o'vned, and in years past had operated, an irrigated farm 
with some additional grazing land. There are two small 
homes located side by side on a. small lot. (R. 265) R. 
George Bradbury (one of the Plaintiffs, as Administra-
tor of his father's estate) is the only child of l\Ir. and 
Mrs. George R. Bradbury. The Defendant, Y ora, was 
raised by the Bradburys as their daughter although she 
in fact is a daughter of a niece who had also been raised 
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by them. (R. 74) Yora lived in the Bradbury home until 
she reached maturity and married and had been treated 
as though she were a child of the Bradburys. (R. 265) 
After she married and moved away she continued to visit 
with the Bradburys and they in turn visited with her on 
holidays or special events such as birthdays. Y ora re-
membered her foster parents on such occasions as their 
birthday or Christmas and showed the normal feelings, 
love and attention to them that a natural child would 
have done. 
For several years prior to the year 1960, the farm 
had been leased or rented to other individuals. (R. 101) 
At least on two different occasions the son, R. George 
Bradbury, had operated the farm (R. 269); but he had 
finally left in 1957 or 1958, apparently telling his father 
that he was going out and get a job and wouldn't have 
the property as a gift. (R. 262) Before their son operated 
it the last time, it had been leased to Leon Taylor for 3 
or 4 years. (R. 101, 102) When R. George left the last 
time, it was rented to M.D. (Dewey) Foreman, a broth-
er of Mrs. Bradbury. (R. 102) He operated the farm 
from 1957 through 1959 (R. 98, 433). Near the end of 
the 1959 season he advised the Bradburys that he was not 
going to operate the farm for them any longer and sug-
gested they consider selling it, but they didn't want to. 
Mr. Bradbury had ''acquired the property from hard 
labor and he didn't feel like he wanted to let loose of it.'' 
(R. 433) 
Insofar as the record discloses, the first time the mat-
ter of Defendants acquiring the property was mentioned 
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wns in October 1959. :Mrs. Bradbury testified that when 
the Rasmussens were down for the deer hunt ~Ir. Brad-
bury said they had been talking about selling the farm 
nnd wanted $300.00 an acre for it, whereupon l\Ir. Ras-
mm;sen said he would think about it. (R. 75) Although 
~lr. and Mrs. Bradbury's testimony differs substantially 
t'rom :Mr. and l\[rs. Rasmussen's there is no dispute that 
tlw matter of acquiring the farm and moving to Joseph, 
Utah, was first discussed in the fall of 1959 and that one 
or more discussions followed until all of the parties (~Ir. 
and l\[ rs. Bradbury and Mr. and Mrs. Rasmussen) went 
to see an attorney, Tex R. Olsen, in Richfield about Jan-
nary 18, or February 1, 1960. (R. 76, 275) The court, in 
its Amended Findings of Facts, found: 
"9. That the said George R. Bradbury and 
Althea Bradbury were interested in having the 
Defendants move to Sevier County and live close 
to the Bradburys where they could have the com-
panionship and association with Defendants and 
their children during their declining years .... 
"11. That prior to the preparation or execution 
of any documents in connection with the instant 
matter the parties met with an attorney, Tex R. 
Olsen, at Richfield, Utah, who counseled and ad-
,·ised the parties with respect to the proposed 
transaction." (R. 51) 
The testimony of the Bradburys differs in many 
respects from the testimony of the Rasmussens as to what 
took place in ~Ir. Olsen's office. However, as will be 
pointed out hereinafter, ~Ir. Olsen corroborated De-
fendants· ,·ersion of what happened. Mrs. Bradbury tes-
tified that ~Ir. Olsen asked ~Ir. Bradbury about the 
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farming ground and how much water there was. Mr. 
Bradbury told him 76 acres and how many shares of 
water he had. (R. 83) 
Although Mrs. Bradbury also testified the papers were 
signed that day in Mr. Olsen's office (R. 84) it appears 
conclusively that they were not. Mr. Bradbury testified 
in his deposition that they were in l\ir. Olsen's office 3 
times. (R.159) The Bradburys and the Rasmussens drove 
to Mr. Olsen's office in separate cars (R. 83). When they 
left the office the Rasmussens went on back to Orem and 
the Bradburys drove back to Joseph (R. 279). Later Mr. 
and Mrs. Bradbury returned to Mr. Olsen's office with 
some tax notices on their property which were more leg-
ible than the ones they had taken the :first day (R. 216, 
217). Later the Bra.dburys returned to Mr. Olsen's office 
a third time where the papers were read to them by Mr. 
Olsen and were signed by them. (R. 130, 218) Both Mr. 
and Mrs. Bradbury testified that Mr. Olsen read the doc-
uments over to them but they claimed they didn't under-
stand them. (R. 130, 219) Mrs. Bradbury testified they re-
ceived a copy of the contract but not the deed. (R. 120) 
The papers signed by the Bradburys in Mr. Olsen's 
office on February 18, 1960, consist of a warranty deed 
conveying their real estate to the Rasmussens, reserving 
a life estate to the grantors and the survivor of them 
(Exh.1, R. 445, 446) and a Farm Lease Agreement where-
by the Bradburys leased the same property to the Ras-
mussens for the term of the life of the survivor of Les-
sors "unless sooner terminated upon mutual agreement." 
( Exh. 2, R. 44 7-449) 
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The following day Mr. Olsen mailed the deed and 
2 copies of the lease to the Rasmussens in Orem, Utah, 
with the request that if the lease appeared to be satis-
factory to sign both copies and return the original ( Exh. 
9, R. 477). This they did. (R. 280) About March 1, 1960, 
ns the Rasmussens were traveling through Joseph, Utah, 
on a trip with some friends, they stopped and Mrs. Ras-
mussen gave Mrs. Bradbury a check for $1.00 as men-
tioned in the deed. (Exh. 7, R. 475) l\Irs. Rasmussen tes-
tified that Mr. Bradbury was present and that she stated 
to the Bradburys she was giving them the check because 
it was part of the deal. (R. 282) 
Shortly thereafter Mr. Rasmussen moved down to 
Joseph and took over the farm. He lived with the Brad-
burys until his family moved down after school let out in 
the spring. Shortly after he arrived on tlie farm Mrs. 
Bradbury wrote to Mrs. Rasmussen telling what Gordon 
was doing. (Exh. 6, R. 474) The Ra.smussens both gave 
up jobs and sold their home in Orem to move down on 
the farm and operate it and live near the Bradburys as 
agreed. (R. 282, 283) 
Later the Bradburys gave Gordon the three cer-
tificates of water stock which were taken to the secretary 
of the Company, along with separate assignments exe-
cuted by the Bradburys, and a new certificate was issued 
to the Rasmussens. The certificate was returned to the 
Bradburys and held by them. (Exhs. 10, 11, 12, 14, R. 479, 
90, 91, 221, 364-368) 
Everything apparently went smoothly for some time 
(R. 284, 437). Gordon Rasmussen worked hard on the 
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farm; and Mr. Bradbury helped him financially to buy 
cattle. (R. 369) Mr. Bradbury testified that the operation 
had been as ·good as it could be. (R. 229) However, after 
1frs. Bradbury made a trip to Salt Lake City with their 
son George in the spring of 1961, she came home and told 
the Rasmussens that things would have to be changed be-
cause the son would not stand for the deal. This is accord-
ing to the testimony of the Rasmussens. (R. 192, 285). 
Mrs. Bradbury testified the break came when a man from 
a bank came to the place in August, 1961, to check on the 
property at which time she and Mr. Bradbury looked the 
papers over and saw what had happened. (R. 88) 
However, her own brother, M.D. Foreman testified that 
in the spring of 1961 ''all at once the devil jumped up 
and they were at each other's throats." (R. 437) In July, 
1961, he drove the Bradburys to St. George to see their 
son and as he picked them up to bring them back their 
son told them to fight it all the way to get the property 
back. ( R. 439) 
The Bradburys contacted Mr. John Vernieu, an at-
torney, of Richfield, who filed suit to rescind the deed 
and water certificate but not the lease, and asked for an 
accounting of the amount due under the lease. (R. 1-11) 
Later, an amendment was filed (R. 12-13) and a jury trial 
demanded. (R. 16) Following the taking of the deposi-
tions of Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury by Defendants, ::\[r. Ver-
nieu withdrew. (R. 17) After Mr. Bradbury passed away, 
other counsel was obtained and a new amended complaint 
was filed seeking to cancel and rescind not only the deed 
and water stock but also the lease agreement. (R. 22-24) 
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During the pendency of the action, the Rasmus-
sPHH continued to live next to the Bradburys, operated 
the farm, and gave assistance and help to the Bradburys 
as opportunity arose. (R. 363) 
Then' are many additional items of fact not related 
above- some of which are in dispute- but further ref-
erence thereto will be made in subsequent portions of this 
brief. At the time of the occurrence of the events leading 
up to and the signing of the documents in question l\fr. 
Bradbury was over 83 years of age and under the findings 
of the court "with ailing eyesight and disabilities inci-
dt'nt to age." l\Irs. Bradbury was 73 years of age. (R. 50) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING A 
"CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP" EXIST-
ED BETWEEN THE BRADBURYS AND DE-
FENDANTSANDTHATDEFENDANTSHAD 
THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE FAIRNESS 
OF THE TRANSACTION. 
One of the major arguments of counsel for Plaintiffs 
during the trial was that there was a ''confidential re-
lationship'' between the Bradburys and the Rasmussens 
which placed the burden on Defendants to prove the fair-
ness of the transaction between the parties. The trial 
court determined that a confidential relationship did exist 
which cast the burden on the Defendants ''to establish 
the perf(_lrt fairness, adequacy of consideration, and 
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equity of the transaction." (R. 33) IIowever, the only 
evidence to sustain this determination was the fact that 
the Bradburys treated Yora Rasmussen as their daugh-
ter and she loved and respected them as her parents. 
This Court has heretofore held that the relationship of 
parent and child is not sufficient to create a "confidential 
relationship'' requiring proof of fairness of the transac-
tion. In the case of Halch v. Hatch, 46 U. 218, 148 P. 433, 
where decedent had made a conveyance to his son at the 
instigation of the Mother, the court held, after discuss-
ing many cases on the subject: 
"In nearly all, if not all, of the foregoing cases 
(excepting those cited from Utah) the question of 
what constitutes a fiduciary relation or one of 
such trust and confidence as ordinarily will cast 
the burden of proof on the beneficiary of a par-
ticular transaction is fully discussed. It is made 
very clear that under circumstances like those in 
the case at bar there is no such fiduciary relation 
of trust and confidence as will cast the burden of 
proof upon the beneficiary under a deed or a. will. 
The relation of parent and child or husband and 
wife does n.ot, in and of itself, create any such pre-
sumption.'' (Emphasis added) 
This same doctrine was again pronounced in the case 
of Froyd v. Barn.hurst, 83 U. 271, 28 P. 2d 135. We quote: 
"Appellants apparently place the burden of 
their argument upon the proposition that there 
was a confidential relationship existing between 
defendant and her mother, Mrs. Sandin, and there-
fore this case is controlled by the rule that, where 
such confidential relationship exists between gran-
tor and grantee, the burden is upon the grantee 
10 
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to show the transaction to be fair and free from 
fraud and undue influence. Appellant cites Peter-
son v. Bu-dge, 35 Utah 596, 102 P. 211; Birdsall v. 
Leavitt, 32 Utah 136, 89 P. 397; TolOJnd v. Corey, 
6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190; Omega Investment Co. v. 
Jroolley, 72 Utah 474, 271 P. 797; also Paddock v. 
Pulsifer_, 43 Kan. 718, 23 P. 1049, 1051. 
"Defendants do not complain of the rule stated 
and followed in these cases, but contend they have 
no application to the case at bar. In other words, 
they contend the facts here do not present a case 
of fiduciary or confidential relationship. Here the 
claim of fiduciary relationship is based upon the 
following evidence in addition to the fact of the 
parties being mother and daughter: The mother 
was old and feeble, could not read or write the 
English language; she lived with the daughter, 
who at one time tried to collect a note belonging 
to her mother without success. For a time they 
had the mother's money in a joint bank account 
in the name of both the mother and daughter, 
and the daughter at times collected the rent due to 
her mother. 
"This court is committed to the doctrine that 
the mere relationship of parent and child does not 
ronstitute evidence of such confidential relation-
ship as to create a presumption of fraud or undue 
influence. Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 P. 
433, 437; Furlong v. Tilley, 51 Utah 617, 172 
P. 676.'' 
The evidence in the instant case is even weaker on 
the matter of confidential relationship than in the two 
cases above cited. The Rasmussens did not live with the 
Bradburys but only visited as children should with par-
ents on speria1 occasions. They had never had any busi-
11 
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ness transactions. Gordon Rasmussen had never operat-
ed the farm or engaged in any family business matters. 
Mr. Bradbury had always handled his own affairs. Al-
though his son had prepared lease agreements for him 
(R. 98) there is no testimony that Gordon Rasmussen had 
ever discussed the operation of the farm prior to October, 
1959. 
In the Hatch case, supra, the court quotes with ap-
proval from the opinion of the Iowa Supreme Court in 
Chidester v. Turnbull, 117 Ia. 168, 90 N.W. 583, a par-
ticularly applicable statement, as follows: 
''Counsel for plaintiffs contend that the burden 
is on the defendant, Thomas Turnbull, to prove 
that the conveyance to him by his father was not 
procured by means of undue influence of or im-
position for which the relations of the parties gave 
opportunity, but this is not true. We have recently 
held that the fact that a voluntary conveyance is 
made from father to son while the father is re-
siding in the son's family, even though the convey-
ance deprives other children of their proportion-
ate share in the father's property, is not pre-
sumptively fraudulent, and will not throw on the 
grantee the burden of proving the want of undue 
influence. The owner of property has a right to 
dispose of it during his lifetime as he sees fit, 
even though his act may, in itself, seem to be 
unfair and unreasonable with reference to the 
interest of other children than the one to whom 
the conveyance is made.'' 
See, also, Fu.rlong v. Tilley, 51 U. 617, 172 P. 676. 
In its written decision in the instant case, the trial 
court relied upon the decision in the case of Petersen "· 
12 
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Bud.rJ(', :~;) U. 596, 102 P. ~11. However, the facts in that 
case are in no way similar to those in the instant matter. 
'fhe relationship of physician and patient existed there, 
which the court held was sufficient in and of itself to 
('reate a ''fiduciary or confidential relationship.'' But 
as wp have seen from the authorities cited above such is 
not the case between parent and child. Furthermore, the 
l \mrt in the Budge case, went on to point out: 
"We think the great preponderance of the evi-
dPlteP clearly establishes the following proposi-
tions: (1) That the plaintiff, at the time of the 
conveyancp in question, was, and for about 10 
days prior thereto had been, sick and nervous and 
greatly distressed in mind. (2) That, while in 
such mental condition, he was induced and led to 
believe by improper and undue influence that the 
bank was about to foreclose its mortgages and 
compel him to make a sacrifice of his mortgaged 
property. (3) That the confidential relationship 
of physician and patient existed between the 
Budges and Peterson at the time the deed in ques-
tion was made and executed. ( 4) That if the 
Budges were not active participants in leading 
and inducing Peterson, in his highly nervous and 
demilitated condition, and while under great men-
tal strain, to believe that the bank was about to 
foreclose its mortgages and compel him to sacri-
fice his mortgaged property - representations 
untrue in fact - they voluntarily accepted the 
conveyance, well knowing such representations to 
have been made, and such inducements brought to 
bear upon him. ( 5) That Peterson, because of his 
ph~·sical weakness and the nervous and unsettled 
state of his mind at the time the deed was made 
and executed, was in no condition to transact busi-
nPss requiring much exertion or mental strain. (6) 
13 
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That the consideration paid by the Budges was 
wholly inadequate. (7) That the defendants have 
failed to sustain the burden of proof cast upon 
them by law to show that the transaction on their 
part was in every respect open, fair and equitable. 
Therefore, even if it were conceded that the 
Budges made no promises whatever to reconvey 
the property to Peterson, he still would be en-
titled to recover in this action." 
In the case of Amado v. Aguirre, 63 Ariz. 213, 161 
P. 2d 117, the Arizona Supreme Court stated the rule as 
follows: 
''A deed or gift from a parent to a child, or from 
one who, in fact, stands in the relationship of a 
parent to a donee, does not require absence of 
fraud and undue influence to sustain it. Under 
such circumstances, the relationship of parent and 
child is not a fiduciary relationship within the 
meaning of the rule applying to gifts or other 
transactions with a fiduciary. Bishop v. Hilliard, 
227 Ill. 382, 81 N.E. 403; White v. Smith, 338 Ill. 
23, 169 N.E. 817; Lee v. Lee, 258 Mo. 599, 167 S.W. 
1030; Sullivan v. Clear, 101 Conn. 603, 127 R. 14; 
Couchman's Adm 'r v. Couchman, 98 Ky. 109, 32 
S.W. 283. This is also the effect of the decision 
of this court in Pass v. Stephens, supra.'' 
The Court then went on to hold: 
''Moreover, to constitute such a confidential or 
fiduciary relation in cases of gifts from parent to 
child, brother and sister, aunt or uncle, and niece 
or nephew, which would authorize a presumption 
of undue influence and change the burden of 
proof, there must be proof of circumstances in-
dicating actual dominance of the donee over the 
donor. 68 C. J. 762, sec. 451, Wills; Wessell v. 
14 
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Rathjohn, 89 N.C. :r77, 43 Am. Rep., 696; Cook v. 
IIilggins, ~90 Mo. 402, 235 S.W. 807; Lee v. Lee, 
Rnpra; Turner v. Gumbert, 19 Idaho 339, 114 
P. 3:1; Stanfield v. Hennegar, 259 Mo. 41, 167 S.,V. 
lO:H>; ~!allow v. Walker, 115 Iowa 238, 88 N.W. 
-t.>~. 91 Am. St. Rep. 158; Slayback v. 'Yitt, 151 
Ind. 376, 50 N.E. 389; Rowe v. Freeman, 89 Or. 
428, 172 P. 508, 17 4 P. 727; Sawyer v. White, 8 
Cir., 122 F. 223." 
In the case of Salvner v. Salcner, 349 :Mich. 37:J, 84 
N.,V. ~d 871, the Supreme Court of l\iichigan made some 
ohRrrvations partienlarly pertinent to the facts in the 
instant ca~<-'. 'Ve quote: 
''. \ gift from a parent to a child, particularly 
under the circumstances disclosed by the case at 
bar, raises no inference or presumption of undue 
influence. Rather, the burden rests in one assert-
i~ invalidity to establish it by satisfactory proof. 
39 Am. J ur. 7 44. 
"On behalf of appellant it is contended that a 
fiduciary relation existed as between him and the 
defendants. The proofs do not support the claim. 
The daughter Thusnelda, and likewise the son, 
unquestionably did many things to assist their fa-
ther, a perfectly natural course of conduct in view 
of his physical condition. However, the record 
falls far short of establishing that plaintiff was 
governed by their advice or that he depended on 
them in the making of decisions concerning his 
business affairs, or otherwise. It clearly appears 
that plaintiff, notwithstanding his physical con-
dition, was able to determine for himself what 
he wished to do and to refuse to act against his 
o·wn inclinations. What defendants did to assist 
him amounted to no more than would be prompted 
normally by the existing relationship.'' 
15 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANTS "EXERT-
ED UNDUE INFLUENCE" UPON THE 
BRADBURYS. 
Although the fact alone that the trial court erro-
neously determined that a "confidential relationship" 
existed between the Bradburys and Defendants would re-
quire a new trial, Appellants urge that the evidence is 
insufficient in any respect to sustain the conclusion of 
law that they exerted undue influence upon the Brad-
burys. In order to make a determination of this issue 
the Court will be required to review the evidence. In this 
connection the language of the Court in Corey v. Roberts, 
82 U. 445, 25 P. 2d 940, is particularly applicable. We 
quote: 
"In equity cases the appeal (Const. Ut~, art. 8, 
sec. 9) may be on questions of both law and fact. 
Such is the appeal in this case. On such review 
the duty of this court requires an examination of 
all questions of law and all facts revealed by the 
record, and, after making such examination and 
due allowance for the better opportunity afforded 
the trial court to observe the demeanor of wit-
nesses, and more advantageous position of de-
termining their credibility and the weight to be 
given to the testimony submitted, this court, anal-
ogous to a trial de novo on the record, will de-
termine from a fair preponderance or greater 
weight of the evidence whether or not the find-
ings of the trial court are supported thereb~'· Law-
ley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Utah, 298, 21~ P. 526." 
In reviewing the evidence in the case we believe this 
court will be impressed with the testimony of the inde-
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pendent witnesses and we therefore briefly summa nze 
what tlwy had to say . 
.. Jttorncy TEx R. OLSEN testified that he had done no 
legal work for the parties prior to February, 1960, at 
whi('h time Gordon Rasmussen came to his office and 
mnde an appointment for himself and his wife and ~Ir. 
and :\lrs. Bradbury. (R. 234) It was an appointment set 
up for a Hundny because the Rasmussens could only be 
down tlwrc on a weekend. (R. 234, 235) When the parties 
rame to his office he was told that the Rasmussens were 
thinking of moving down from Orem to Sevier County, 
leaving their job, to take care of the farm and that they 
wanted to work out some arrangement so the farm 
wouldn't go to anyone else after the death of the Brad-
hnrys. There was a discussion as to how to work this 
out so that the Rasmussens could take care of the prop-
Prty and of the Bradburys during their declining years. 
~r rs. Bradbury said in this conversation that she wanted 
to gin:- these kids some security if they came down to 
the property. It was discussed that the use of a will could 
be changed and that therefore this would be no security 
because their son, R. G. Bradbury, could come in in the 
event there was a change. Mr. Olsen then suggested the 
giving of a deed, reserving a life estate to the Bradburys. 
The ''Bradburys thought this would be agreeable with 
them because they wanted the property to go to the Ras-
mussens and they wanted some assurance that they would 
get somethi11g- out of it during their lifetime." (R. 236) 
They then discussed how the property would be operated 
during the lifetime of the Bradburys and it was decided 
to execute a lease to the Hasmussens by which the net 
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profits derived from the farm would be divided fifty-fifty. 
(R. 237) In talking about the deed Mr. Olsen pointed out 
to all four that it would be "an absolute conveyance and 
if they had a life estate, they wouldn't have any secur-
ity they could mortgage or anything else." (R. 237) The 
attorney even suggested leaving out the pasture ground 
and give the Rasmussens an option to buy it so the Brad-
burys "would have some security they could use." How-
ever, Mr. Bradbury said, "It's an operating unit." "It 
all goes together." (R. 238) The description of the 
property was discussed, and the Bradburys produced 
some tax assessment notices. These were blotched and 
could not be read so Mrs. Bradbury agreed to bring down 
some additional notices. (R. 238) The conference lasted 
about an hour and a half to two hours. (R. 239) They 
discussed getting together again but ::\Ir. Rasmussen said 
he and his wife had to get back to Orem and wondered 
if they needed to be there any more. Mr. Olsen agreed 
to mail them the papers after they were prepared and 
signed by the Bradburys. (R. 239) About two days later 
Mrs. Bradbury came back to Mr. Olsen's office and 
brought several tax notices on which were contained the 
legal descriptions. At that time she asked :Mr. Olsen if 
Yora was an heir and Mr. Olsen told her "No." Mrs. 
Bradbury then remarked that the other property they 
might have in their name would go to their son. (R. 240) 
Mr. Olsen agreed to call the Bradburys when the papers 
were ready. 
On February 17th or 18th, 1960, l\Ir. and ~Irs. Brad-
bury came to his office after the papers had been pre-
18 
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pared for signing .. Mr. Olsen testified that he went over 
the arrangements, the warranty deed with the reservation 
of a life estate and also went over the lease with them, 
nnd they told him "that's what they had in mind." (R. 
:!41 ) The deed was signed and notarized and the lease 
was sign<'d. At that time Mr. Olsen gave Mr. and ~frs. 
Bra<lbury a carbon copy of the deed and also a carbon 
C'opy of the lease. (R. 241) He stated that he had ob-
sPt'Ved that both Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury were alert, able 
to discusH these things; that Mr. Bradbury had quite a 
sense of humor; and even joked about the arrangement 
which he felt would require him to contribute financially 
to help the Rasmussens get started; (R. 242) that Mr. 
Bradbury was having some difficulty getting around be-
cause of his age, but otherwise appeared to be quite alert. 
(R. ~42) At the time of the signing of the documents 
there was just Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury present in addition 
to the attorney. (R. 243) He thereafter mailed the docu-
ments to the Rasmussens. He prepared the assignments 
that were attached to the water certificates, but they 
were not signed in his presence. (R. 246) 
On cross-examination Mr. Olsen said that the rea-
son that the Rasmussens talked to him about having this 
fixed up is that they wanted to be protected if they came 
down on the property and that if the parents died they 
did not want to haYe R. G. "booting" them off the prop-
erty. (R. 248, 249) 
OTTO KESLER, who resides at Cove Fort across the 
mountain from Joseph, testified that he had been 
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acquainted with George Bradbury during his life time. 
He said he had known him for better than 50 years and 
he also knew his wife. He recalled a conversation with 
Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury in June of 1960 or 61 when some 
cattle had gotten away from them and he saw ?\Ir. and 
Mrs. Bradbury together with Gordon Rasmussen. This 
was the first time he had ever met Gordon Rasmussen. 
(R. 231) Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury told this witness that the 
Rasmussens were going to take care of them and they were 
turning the property over to him to take care of them 
during their old age; that their son R. G. had gotten dis-
couraged and left the farm and he had given no help to 
them on the farm. (R. 232) On cross-examination he tes-
tified that Mr. Bradbury said, "I was letting them have 
it for taking care of me. I am letting them have it for 
taking care of us in our old age." (R. 232, 233) 
JosEPH 0. NELSON, who lives in Richfield, testified 
that he knew all of the parties. (R. 251, 252) He worked 
for the Texas Oil Company and delivered gasoline to the 
farmers in the area which sometimes required credit to 
them. He had extended credit to George Bradbury and 
to his son R. G. (R. 252) When Gordon Rasmussen took 
over the operation of the farm and wanted credit, the wit-
ness discussed with Mr. Bradbury the company policy of 
not extending credit unless the owner of the property 
signed with the operator to guarantee payment for the 
oil products. He explained fully to Mr. Bradbury ·what 
the signature involved, read it over to him and ::\[r. Brad-
bury seemed to understand it, was able to hear him and 
discussed it with him. (R. 253-255) ::\Ir. Nelson further 
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testified about a conversation that he had with George 
Hradbury hefore the signing of this guarantee in which 
~[r. Bradbury said that his son George couldn't run the 
place and that he couldn't continue to run the place; that 
Gordon Rasmussen was to have the property after l\Ir. 
and ~[rs. Bradbury had passed away. He also said that 
they were to have the property if they took care of the 
expenses of ~Ir. and ~Irs. Bradbury. (R. 257) 
?\In. KEITH OGDEN, who lived in Marysvale and had 
been acquainted with the Bradburys fo_r approximately 
20 years and had business dealings with them, (R. 259) 
testified that in November, 1959, he and his wife had a 
conversation with Mr. Bradbury whom they had taken 
for a ride with them over to Scipio, Utah. (R. 259) In 
this conversation l\Ir. Bradbury said that he knew that 
his son could not run the property and he also knew that 
Gordon Rasmussen had a. good job and that Yora worked 
and they had a good home in Orem; that he would have 
to make them a good deal if they were going to come down 
and help him out. ''He said, 'I've leased it out for a 
couple of years and that wasn't much good,' so he told us 
that he told them that if they would take care of us the 
rest of our time, they could have it." (R. 261, 262) He 
said that his son R. G. had received two or three propo-
~itions and that he had tried to make it interesting for 
him, but R. G. said he wouldn't have it as a gift, that 
he was going out and get a. job. (R. 262) He further testi-
fied that nothing was said about selling the property to 
the Rasmussens. (R. 263, 264) 
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Defendants even required the attendance by subpoe-
na of the brother of Mrs. Bradbury who had leased the 
farm for approximately three years before the Ras-
mussens came down. Although he was understandably 
reluctant to testify, MR. M. D. FoRMAN testified that he 
had advised Mr. and Mrs. Bradbury to sell the property 
but they didn't seem to want to; that he drove them up 
to Orem to talk to Mr. and l\1rs. Rasmussen about the 
property. (R. 443) He had a conversation with the Brad-
burys about the Rasmussens coming down on the prop-
erty and the Bradburys told him that the Rasmussens 
were coming down to take over the property and that 
they (the Bradburys) were to get one-half of the pro-
ceeds from the farm. (R. 434, 435) He said that in this 
same conversation the Bradburys told him the property 
was to revert to Gordon and Yora when they (Mr. and 
:Mrs. Bradbury) were deceased. (R. 436) He further tes-
tified that he observed the relationship between the par-
ties ·when they first moved down in the year of 1960 and 
they got along very well. But in the spring of 1961 that 
''all at once the devil jumped up and they were at each 
other's throats so I don't know what took place;" (R. 
437) that on July 27, he took Mr. and 1\frs. Bradbury 
down to St. George to see R. G. Bradbury and that as 
he was picking them up to bring them back, he heard their 
son say to them, "Well, we just as well fight it all the 
way." (R. 439) 
The only persons produced by the plaintiffs who 
could be considered to be independent and have no inter-
est in the outcome of the litigation were JUNIOR E. D1xox 
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and V. V. JENSON. MR. DixoN, a locker plant operator, 
testitll'd tha.t after Gordon Rasmussen came back, the 
Bradburys told the witness they ''were making arrange-
mE.lnts so that they could buy the farm." (R. 181) How-
ever, he couldn't remember in what year this conversa-
tion occurred (R. 187) and it was just a passing remark. 
(R. 182) 
:\[R. JENSON testified he was in the dry cleaning busi-
ness and knew Mr. Bradbury in his lifetime. (R. 403, 
404) He talked to Mr. Bradbury once about his farm 
and was told that Gordon was going to buy it from him. 
(R. 405) This occurred in March or April after Gordon 
had taken over the farm. 
This testimony while having some probative value 
as to whether 1\ir. Bradbury considered what had been 
done as being a sale, has no effect or weight on the real 
issue of whether Defendants had exerted undue influence 
upon the Bra.dburys. For such consideration we turn 
briefly to the testimony of the Bradburys themselves. 
This testimony was very contradictory in many respects, 
not only as between :Mr. and ~Irs. Bradbury but in the 
course of relating the facts by the same witness 1\irs. 
Bradbury testified the papers were prepared and signed 
the first time they went to ~Ir. Olsen's office and in the 
presence of the Rasmussens. (R. 83, 84) :Jir. Bradbury 
testified that they were there three times. (R. 213, 214) 
Mrs. Bradbury testified she discussed "rith Tex Olsen the 
effect of giving the property to Yora and her husband-
whether Yora would still get something from the estate, 
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(R. 119) but she testified she couldn't understand when 
Mr. Olsen read the documents to them before the~· were 
signed. (R. 84) She testified she thought they ·were sign-
ing a contract for the sale of the farm. (R. 85) But she 
went on to testify that the only compensation or money 
that the Rasmussens were going to pay was one-half of 
the proceeds of what came off the farm (R. 135, 145) 
and that the only written agreement she thought tl1ey 
had was for the lease. (R. 146) 
Although plaintiffs asserted (and the court found) 
that Mr. Bradbury had ailing eyesight and other disabili-
ties incident to age, there is no claim that either ::\Ir. or 
~Irs. Bradbury was mentally infirm. In fact, Mrs. Brad-
bury was very active physically, drove the car, wrote out 
the checks and othenYise participated in the business af-
fairs of her husband. Despite his age, Mr. Bradbury was 
intelligent and alert and worked around the farm \Yith 
Gordon Rasmussen, bought seed grain (R. 223), paid the 
taxes ( R. 224) recommended buying cattle and assisted 
in doing so (R. 227, 228) and consulted with Gordon 
about how the farm should be operated. (R. 228) 
Since lVIr. Bradbury had passed a-way after the ac-
tion was filed, his deposition was read as his testimony. 
Several changes had been made in it ·which the court 
allowed to be read although there was no evidence as to 
how the changes had been made, who made them, or the 
reason therefor. If l\Ir. Bradbury was alert enough to 
make changes in his testimony from having his deposi-
tion read to him, he was alert enough to understand a 
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dPt>tl and a lease when they were read to him - particu-
larl v since he had had previous experience of leasing the 
premises. In summary, he testified that the first time 
ht> knl'W the Rasmussens \Vere going to come down and 
operate the farm was at Christmas time (R. 211) He 
said that he would sell them the farm for $300.00 per 
lH'l'l' but there was nothing said about how much down 
or when they were to pa.y for it. (R. 212) There was no 
spPei fit>(l amount per year to be paid but they were to pay 
oHt>-half of what was made from the farm after expenses 
werP taken out. ( R. 213) There was never any discussion 
about paying anything more than one-half of what they 
g-rew on the farm after expenses and the Rasmussens 
were not to pay after he died. ( R. 213) He testified that 
he met with Tex Olsen in Tex Olsen's office three times 
and that they talked about this matter when Gordon and 
his wife were there and that Tex was going to fix up a 
lt>a~e to run the farm. (This was later changed on his 
deposition to read that he was going to fix a contract 
to purchase the farm.) (R. 214) Gordon did not say 
anything about going to buy the farm while they were in 
~Ir. Olson's office. (R. 214) The agreement vvas that the 
llefendants were to pay one-half of what they grew on 
the property after expenses were paid. (R. 216) He and 
his wife had taken some tax notices down to Tex Olsen's 
office because on the ones that they brought with them at 
first the descriptions were blotted so badly Mr. Olsen 
could not read them. (R. 216) He admitted signing Ex-
hibits 1 & ~ (the warranty deed and lease). (R. 218) 
These documents were read to him before they were 
siglWll and he understood that the Rasmussens were 
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going to pay one-half of the crops after they had pai< 
expenses. (R. 2193 He claimed he never signed the as 
siguments of the water certificates and that he had bee1 
over to the irrigation company to check to see if the~ 
bore his signature and that they did not. (R. 220) He rec· 
ognized that the certificates brought back by Yora wPn 
not the same ones that he had given out, but he neve~ 
questioned ·why and had his wife put them in the box witlJ 
the other papers. (R. 221) It was a year after these cer-
tificates were brought in by Y ora that l\Ir. Bradhnry 
questioned them and asked his wife to get them out 
again. They then talked to the Rasmussens about what 
had happened. (R. 222) 
We submit that this does not support an:T finding 
or determination that he did not know what he was doing 
or that undue influence ''Tas exerted upon him. 
This court has had the opportunity on numerous oc-
casions to consider whether a transfer of property should 
be set aside on the ground of undue influence. In the very 
early case of Chadd v. IIi oser, 25 U. 369, 71 P. 870, this 
court reversed the trial court in setting aside a convey-
ance on the ground of undue influence and mental ca-
pacity. In doing so, this Court said: 
"The record shows conclusively that, at the time 
the deed was made, plaintiff was in possession 
and in full control of her mental faculties. She 
knew and understood what he was doing, and was 
in every respect competent to act for herself. She 
had the advice and assistance of a competent and 
reliable attorney, who took pains to explain to 
her what the legal effect of the act of deeding away 
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lwr property would be. In fact, there is no evi-
denre whatever to the contrary, except the sweep-
ing statement of plaintiff, made at the trial, that 
she was "erazy" and did not know what she was 
doing-. The only evidence introduced that tends 
to st~pport the contention of want of capaci~y ~n 
the part of plaintiff is that she was aged, 1n Ill 
health, and very much enfeebled. But want of 
capacity to contract will not be presumed because 
of old age or physical infirmities. (Citing cases) 
'·It appears from the record that the plaintiff, 
about a year before the deed was made, spoke to 
the defendants about deeding the property to 
them, and subsequently, on several occasions, 
again mentioned the matter; but there is not a 
scintilla of evidence that either of the defendants 
e\'er mentioned the matter to her until the day on 
which the deed was executed. After they arrived 
at the office of the attorney who prepared the deed, 
there was some discussion as to whether the plain-
tiff should dispose of the property by will or by 
deed. Plaintiff was in favor of making a will, but 
the defendants refused to advance any more 
money to protect the property and improve it and 
help the plaintiff unless the conveyance was by 
deed, which they had a perfect right to do. No 
matter what moral obligations they were under 
to take care of plaintiff and protect her property, 
it must be conceded that they were under no legal 
o~~igation to do so. The plaintiff finally, in oppo-
~thon to the advice of her attorney, decided to 
make a deed, which was done. Defendant Mrs. 
~loser, with the exception of about five years, had 
lived all her life with her mother, and had raised 
a large family under the same roof, and had re-
cently cared for and nursed her through a severe 
spell of siekness. Defendants had for several 
years given plaintiff money to pay the taxes as-
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sessed against the property. The property ha< 
been sold for assessments made for the extensior 
of water mains, and more taxes, amounting tf 
$31.50, would soon be due, which plaintiff was un-
able to pay. In addition to the care, attention, and 
assistance thus extended, the defendants, by the 
provisions of the lease, were obligated to con-
tinue to assist and provide for plaintiff during 
the rest of her life. Under these circumstances, 
coercion and undue influence will not be inf<>rred. 
While courts of equity will carefully scrutinize 
transactions of this character, when entered into 
between parent and child, yet when, as in this 
case, as shown by the record, no undue influencC' 
has been used, such contracts will not be disturbed, 
provided the complaining party at the time of 
the transaction had legal and mental capacity to 
contract.'' 
Again, in Stringfellow Y. Hanson, 25 U. 480, 71 P. 
1052, this Court reversed a decision of the lower court 
which had set aside a deed from father to daughter on 
the grounds of undue influence, inadequate considera-
tion and incompetence of the grantor. The grantor, as 
here, was the party who initiated the action to have the 
conveyance set aside. The court discussed each of the 
grounds for annuling the deed relied on by the low(·r 
court, as follows : 
''We think the record wholly fails to show that 
defendant exercised any undue influence over 
the plaintiff at the time of, or prior to, the exe-
cution of the deed to the five acres. There is some 
evidence in the record that she (the defendant) 
had stated to some of her neighbors that she had 
received a revelation from her mother, and that 
it \\·as her mother's wish that plaintiff deed the 
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lnnd in question to her, and that she had commu-
nicah•d thesP alleged spiritual manifestations to 
her father. Plaintiff's deposition was taken in 
his own behalf, and read in evidence. He testified 
that, hrfore the deed was made, Emma had spoken 
to him two or thrN• timPs about having a revelation 
from her mother, but he does not state that he was 
influenced or induced to make the deed because 
of the alleged revelation. On the contrary, he 
repeah•dly reiterated that he deeded the land to 
hrr hecause it was the wish of his wife, before 
her dt>ath, that Emma should have it, and because 
she had been kind to them, and had taken care 
of her mother during the latter's sickness. We do 
not think the finding that defendant used or exer-
eisPd undue influence over plaintiff at the time 
the deed to the five acres was executed is support-
ed hy thr evidence. It is a well-established rule of 
law that when a parent, who is legally competent 
to contract, makes a gift to his child in considera-
tion of love and affection, it will be upheld. The 
conduct of Emma Hanson toward her aged par-
t•nts was such as would naturally tend to inspire 
their love and gratitude, as it was clearly shown 
that she, for two years, with but little, if any, aid 
from any of her brothers or sisters, or other rela-
tions, constantly cared for and waited upon her 
invalid and helpless mother, and after her moth-
n's death continued to care for, comfort and ad-
. . ' 
munster to the wants of her old father in his be-
reaYement. .A.nd the record affirmatively shows 
that in pursuance of the high and commendable 
dt'\·otion thus shown, and services rendered, and in 
pursuance of the mother's wish, made known to 
plaintiff, before his death, as shown by his own 
tl'stimony, plaintiff conveyed to defendant the 
five acres of land in question. Under these cir-
cumstances, we think the consideration was not 
only meritorious, but valuable, and in every re-
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spect adequate. 1 Jones, Law Real Prop. in Conv. 
27 4; Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah, 480, 33 Par. 
218. In the case of McCall v. McCall, 135 U. S. 
167, 10 Sup. Ct. 705, 34 L. Ed. 84. Mr. Justice 
Brewer, speaking for the court, said: "Right or 
·wrong, it would be expected that a parent will 
favor a child who stands by him, and give to him, 
rather than the others, his property. To defeat 
a conveyance under these circumstances, some-
thing more than the natural influence springing 
from such relations must be shown- imposition, 
fraud, importunity, duress, or something of that 
nature, must appear." Again: "It would be a 
great reproach to the law, if, in its jealous watch-
fulness over the freedom of testamentary disposi-
tion, it should deprive age and infirmity of the 
kindly ministrations of affection, or of the power 
of rewarding those who bestow them.'' 
"It is contended by respondent that the only con-
sideration for the conveyance that can be con-
sidered is that expressed in the instrument itself. 
We do not understand this to be the law. The 
rule is that in cases such as the one under con-
sideration, where the rights of creditors are not 
involved, the entire consideration may be shown. 
Devlin on Deeds (1st Ed.) sec. 822 ; 1 Jones, Real 
Prop. in Conv. : sec. 295 ; Rankin's Adm 'rs v. W al-
lace (Ky.) 14 S.W. 79; Barbee v. Barbee (N.C.) 
13 S.E. 215. '' 
In the recent case of Richmond Y. Ballard, 7 U. 2d 
341, 325 P. 2d 839, this Court, in reversing the lower 
court's finding of undue influence and deceased's ad-
vanced age and debilitated condition reiterated the cri-
terion for setting aside a conveyance, as follows : 
"Undue influence must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence. In N orthcrest, Inc. v. Walker 
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Bank and Trust Co. this court, at page 271 of the 
Utah Report and at page 693 of the Pacific Re-
porter, said: 
'Undisputed is the plaintiff's contention that 
one who asserts the invalidity of a deed must 
so prove by clear and convincing evidence.' 
''Not only did the evidence fail to establish that 
the signature to the deed was procured by undue 
influence but the finding of undue influence is 
against the clear weight of the evidence.'' 
The Court further quoted with approval from two 
l\nrlier Utah cases, Anderson v. Thomas, 108 U. 252, 159 
P. :!d 142; and In re Lavelle's Estate, 122 U. 253, 248 P. 
2d 372. 
In the Anderson Case the evidence relied on by the 
plaintiff to set aside the conveyance included the follow-
ing facts: 
'' ( 1) The transfer to the defendant son was with-
out consideration (other than love and affec-
tion); 
(2) The Grantor (mother) was 86 years old; 
( 3) She was failing in health and almost totally 
blind; 
( 4) At time of the transfer she was grieving 
over the loss of another son; 
( 5) Court found that, under the circumstances, 
the Grantor could have been easily imposed 
upon; 
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(7) The Grantee received "substantially all" of 
Grantor's property a few months before 
Grantors death; 
(8) The transfer to Grantee in effect disinher-
ited six other children; 
"This Court, in an opinion by Justice Wolfe, af-
firmed the district court's decision refusing to find 
undue influence on the above facts, stating: 
'However, these circumstances alone are not 
sufficient to show undue influence. The plain-
tiff must do more than merely raise a sus-
picion. There must be some affirmative evi-
dence to show that Richard did exercise a 
dominating influence over this mother and 
thus induced her to part with her property. 
Such affirmative evidence is almost totally 
lacking here.' 
"The court observed that 'no one testified to any-
thing that would indicate that Richard was bring-
ing pressure to bear on his mother to effect the 
transfer of this property to him.' '' 
In the case of In re Lavelle's Esta.te, supra, this 
Court reversed a finding that a will had been induced by 
undue influence. This Court, speaking through Jus tire 
Crockett, held : 
''To declare a will invalid because of undue 
influence, there must be an exhibition of more 
than influence or suggestion, there must be sub-
stantial proof of an overpowering of the testator's 
volition at the time the will was made, to the ex-
tent he is impelled to do that ·which he would 
not have done had he been free from such con-
trolling influence, so that the will represents the 
desire of the person exercising the influence rath-
er than that of the testator." 
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Courts in other jurisdictions have held similarly. 
The California Supreme Court in the case of Burns v. 
Campbell, 17 Cal. 2d 768, 112 P. 2d 237, reversed a de-
rision of the lower court holding a deed to have been pro-
cured hy undue influence with these pertinent comments : 
"Concerning undue influence, there is no evi-
dence whatever that the appellant exercised any 
control over ~Ir. Burns or that her actions were 
the result of his direction. In addition to the 
testimony concerning the conversation between 
~~ n;;. Burns and appellant when she asked him to 
return to the ranch, two other witnesses related 
statements made by her at later times on this 
suhjrrt. One of them said that in 1932 Mrs. Burns 
told him she was going to deed the ranch to the a p-
pellant because he had done more for her than any-
one else, with the exception of her sons. Another 
related that she told him she had executed the 
deed to him. The testimony of the attorney who 
prepared the deed is clear and unequivocal that 
~~ rs. Burns expressed the desire to convey her 
ranch to the appellant and that she stated her 
reason for so doing. There is no evidence that the 
appellant ever requested her to execute a deed 
to him or that he influenced her in that or any 
other matter." 
The court also commented that the "trial court made 
findings in literal accordance with the allegations of the 
eomplaint. ·' (Ibid. p. 239) This was also done by the 
trial court in the instant case although a few changes 
were made after Defendants objected and argued their 
motion to amend the findings. 
One of the findings made by the trial court in this 
t'<lSt.' is that the Bradburys "did not have the benefit of 
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independent advice in connection with said transactions.'' 
(R. 52) However, Mr. Olsen had never represented 
either of the parties before; (R. 234) the Bradburys wPn• 
there twice and discussed the matter with him after the 
Rasmussens; (R. 240, 241) the Bradburys paid him for 
his services; (Exh. 9, R. 477) and the trial court held 
that their conversation with him, after this action was 
commenced, was privileged and could not be disrloRPd. 
(R. 125-127) 
In Binder v. Binder, 50 W. 2d 142, 309 P. 2d 1050, the 
Washington Supreme Court reversed a decision of the 
lower court which annulled and cancelled a deed given 
by the plaintiff (mother) to the defendant (her son). As 
to the burden of proof the Court held : 
''Mental competenry is presumed; and in or-
der to establish mental incompetency, fraud, or 
undue influence, the evidence must be clear, co-
gent, and convincing. Tecklenburg v. \Vashington 
Gas & Electric Co., 40 Wash. 2d 141, 241 P. 2d 
1172, 117 4." 
Again, on the matter of undue influence, the court held: 
''In order to sustain the finding of undue in-
fluence in this case, where no mental incompetency 
has been shown, the record must reveal that the 
respondent was so completely under the influence 
of appellant that she was incapable of acting on 
her own motives: 
" 'Influence becomes undue only when it 
overcomes the will of the grantor ; when the 
grantor acts under such coercion that his own 
free agency is destroyed. The grantor's 
views may be radically changed by the in-
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fluence exercised, but so long as he is not 
overborne and rendered incapable of acting 
upon his own motives, his acts are his own 
nets, not those of another.' ParrY. Campbell, 
109 'V ash. 376, 186 P. 858, quoted in Vossen 
v. Wilson, 39 Wash. 2d 906, 239 P. 2d 558, 
;)60. '' 
\V ~' submit from the foregoing analysis of the facts 
and the law that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the determination of undue influence. 
POINT III 
THERE \VAS ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION 
~,OR 'rHE TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY 
A~D THE EXECUTION OF THE LEASE. 
'The plaintiffs argued, and the Court found in effect, 
that the transfer of the property and water stock was a 
gift and without consideration (Finding No. 13 (c) and 
(d) R. :>2). However, the Court further found, as set 
forth in tlw Statement of Facts, that Bradburys were in-
tt>rested in haYing the Defendants move to Sevier County 
and live close to them "where they could have the com-
panionship and association with defendants and their 
rhildren during their declining years''; and that ''De-
fendants gave up their home in Or em, Utah, and moved 
to St'\·il'l' County and took over the operation of the 
farm.·· In doing so the Defendants testified that they 
both gaYe up good jobs in Orem. :Jir. Rasmussen was 
making around $400.00 per month and :Jlrs. Rasmussen 
was making about $225.00 per month. (R. 282) 
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In the case of Randall v. Tracy CoZZ.ins Trust Com-
pany, 6 U. 2d 18, 305 P. 2d 480, the court was concerned 
with a situation where the Plaintiff left his business and 
home in Ogden and moved to Provo, Utah, which to-
gether with services rendered for the decedent was held 
to be adequate consideration for an agreement to convey 
real property. 
In the case of Gibbons v. Brimm, 119 U. 621, 230 P. 
2d 983, an action was brought to set aside a conveyance 
of property to the Defendant which was made in return 
for Defendant's promise to provide Plaintiff with a home, 
support and care upon the ground that Plaintiff was so 
infirm of body and mind "that her will was overcome to 
the extent that the execution and delivery of the docu-
ments were not her voluntary acts.'' The Defendant 
grantee in that case was a niece who had been the object 
of special affection from the Plaintiff. The Grantor was 
75 years of age, in ill health, and desired to have the De-
fendant come to live with her, care for her and run the 
farm. Comments of the Court are particularly pertinent 
to the facts in the instant matter, which we quote: 
''The plaintiff apparently set out to make two 
main contentions in seeking to avoid the effects of 
the deed, bill of sale and assignment. (1) That 
she was so infirm of body and mind that her will 
was overcome to the extent that the execution and 
delivery of the documents were not her voluntary 
acts; and (2) that the defendants breached the 
agreement to provide her a home and care, which 
entitles her to rescission. The burden of proving 
these contentions was upon the plaintiff.'' 
36 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Also: 
"Without delineating them, we observe that the 
PYidL•nre r<:'veals some discrepancies in plaintiff's 
testimony concerning the ownership and disposi-
tion of personal property which may have given 
rise to some skepticism on the part of the trial 
court with respect to plaintiff's frankness, or per-
haps better stated, her lack of memory and under-
standing of details due to her infirmity and ad-
vanced age. 
''The plaintiff made some effort in the evidence 
to ~upport her first point that the execution of the 
conveyances were not voluntary. The sequence of 
events themselves, without more, would be suffi-
cient refutation of this contention. But taken to-
gether with other evidence there is ample to 
warrant the court in refusing to believe that plain-
tiff had met her burden of proof that she did not 
intend the conveyances.'' 
See also: Desert Centers, Inc. v. Glen Canyon, Inc., 
u r. 2d 166, 356 P. 2d 286. 
There was obviously adequate consideration for the 
transfer in the instant case and the court should have 
~o found. "\Y e wish to call attention to the fact that the 
trial court did find : 
·'That at all times during the negotiations for the 
~ale and purchase of the farm George R. Brad-
bury, deceased, and Althea Bradbury advised De-
fendants that the farm would be theirs upon the 
death of the Bradburys, by virtue of contractual 
obligations and subject thereto." (Finding No. 8 
R. 51) ' 
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The contractual obligations referred to by the court 
could mean only the obligation to move to Joseph, Utah, 
and take over the farm and live near the Bra.dburys, 
where the latter could enjoy the companionship and asso-
ciation of Defendants and their children. Since Defend-
ants complied in every respect they are entitled, as the 
Defendant in the Brimm case, supra, to have the con-
tract and agreement enforced. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO A 
JURY TRIAL. 
Plaintiffs initially filed a demand for a jury trial. 
(R. 16) Thereafter, at the pretrial conference PlaintiffH 
attempted to withdraw their demand; but Defendants 
refused to agree thereto and requested the court to try 
the case to a jury. Rule 39(a) U.R.C.P. provides: 
''When trial by jury has been demanded as 
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated 
upon the register of actions as a jury action. The 
trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, 
unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record, 
by written stipulation filed with the court or by 
an oral stipulation made in open court and en-
tered in the record, consent to trial by the court 
sitting without a jury, or (2) the court upon mo-
tion or of its own initiative finds that a right by 
trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not 
exist, of (3) either party to the issue fails to ap-
pear at the trial.'' 
The court determined that the right of a trial by jury 
did not exist, this being a case in equity, and therefore 
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dispensed with a jury. Since no record of the pretrail 
proceedings was made, the record on appeal does not dis-
close the ruling of the trial court. However, the record 
does disclose that the case was not tried to a. jury and 
that such jury trial was not waived by Defendants after 
dE'mand had been made. 
Sp<·tion 78-21-1, U.C.A.. 1953 gives to the parties a 
right to trial by jury "in actions for the recovery of spe-
eific real or personal property, with or without damages.'' 
In discussing when a trial by jury is required under our 
~tatute this court, in the case of Norbeck v. Board of 
Directors of Church Extension Society, 84 U. 506, 37 P. 
2d 339 held: 
''Almost without exception, the rule is that ac-
tions to try the title of real estate shall be tried 
to a jury." 
The court further stated: 
''The mere fact that a suit is one to quiet title to 
real property is not controlling. Generally a suit 
to quiet title to real property is regarded as an 
equitable proceeding; but because it is so regarded 
does not determine the nature of the issue or de-
prive a party of his right to a trial by jury. If the 
only question involved is that of title, the issue is 
generally legal. A suit to establish an easement is 
legal. :Jiason v. Ross, 77 N.J. Eq. 527, 77 A. 44. '' 
This matter was recently considered by Justice Wade 
in a separate opinion in the case of Johnson v. Johnson 
' 9 rtah 2d 420, 337 P. 2d 20. That case involved an action 
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to rescind certain conveyances of real property, Justice 
Wade made the following observation: 
''I concur except I think this is an action to 
recover real property and under Section 78-21-1 
defendant was entitled to a jury trial. That sec-
tion provides that '' (I)n actions for the recovery 
of specific real or personal property, with or with-
out damages * * * an issue of fact may be tried 
by a jury, unless a jury is waived or a reference 
is ordered." We have held a number of times that 
this statute is controlling. 
''Defendant did not claim the right to a jur~' 
under this statute. He claims that this is a law 
action because it is a will contest. He seems to 
concede that the action to recover the real estate 
is a suit in equity because it seeks to set aside a 
contract of sale and a conveyance and a will on the 
ground of fraud, undue influence and incompe-
tency. It is hard to understand how a will con-
test is a law action but a suit to cancel a will 
before the testator's death but after he has become 
incompetent is a suit in equity. This illustrates 
the maze of inconsistencies and borderline deci-
sions required in applying the rule that the right 
of a jury trial is determined by whether the ques-
tion is raised in an action at law or a suit in equity 
or whether the issues are legal or equitable." 
SUMMARY 
In conclusion Appellants respectfully urge that there 
was no ''confidential relationship'' between Bradburys 
and Defendants and therefore that the court below erro-
neously placed the burden on the Defendants "to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged gifts 
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were t'uir, equitable, valid and free from any fraud or 
undue influence arising from the faith and trust reposed 
in them because of the confidential relationships.'' 
Because of its misconception as to the relationship 
betwPt'll the parties, the lower court concluded that there 
was undue influence exerted on the Bradburys by the 
Defendants although the evidence is insufficient to show 
hy clear and convincing proof any undue influence. On 
t ht> contrary the transfers were made, and the lease exe-
cuted, for good and sufficient consideration after the 
Bradburys discussed the matter with legal counsel and 
obtained his advice as to how the matter should be han-
dled. And finally, the court improperly failed to allow 
the matter to be tried by a jury after a jury trial had 
been requested. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
NIELSEN, CoNDER & HANSEN 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
41 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
